

## ONE-WAY BILINGUALISM: THE OBSTACLES TO THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLETENESS OF SPAIN'S PERIPHERAL LANGUAGES

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### Abstract

This article applies the concepts of *one-way bilingualism*, *territorial niche* (Jean Laponce) and *institutional completeness* (Raymond Breton) – developed by Canadian academic literature in the fields of political science and sociolinguistics – to the analysis of the language policies of the Spain. After reviewing these concepts and their context of occurrence against the background of the processes of recognition of French-speaking minorities in Canada, this article focuses on the Spanish constitutional framework and the corresponding legislation and case law to see how they have contributed, since the 1980s, to a one-way bilingualism, with Castilian as the “common” and default language of Spain. This one-way bilingualism is, to a large extent, attributable to a set of legal mechanisms, such as the constitutional hierarchy of languages, the inaction of the state with regard to its legal duty to effectively protect Spanish languages other than Castilian, as well as limitations on the regulatory capacity of autonomous communities on matters pertaining to language policies, mainly through case law. In addition to these mechanisms, there is a conflicting conception of the co-existence of languages, according to which any further recognition of Spain's peripheral languages would imply an attack on the privileged position of Castilian. The article conclusion suggests overcoming this paradigm by thoroughly normalising all Spanish minoritised languages, following the example of Castilian, and by generalising greater linguistic equity.

Keywords: language policy; multilingualism; one-way bilingualism; territorial niche; institutional completeness; Spain; Spanish languages; Canada; French Canadians.

## BILINGÜISME DE SENTIT ÚNIC: ELS OBSTACLES A LA PLENITUD INSTITUCIONAL DE LES LLENGÜES PERIFÈRIQUES DE L'ESTAT ESPANYOL

### Resum

L'article aplica els conceptes de bilingüisme de sentit únic i nínxol territorial (Laponce) i de plenitud institucional (Breton), desenvolupats per la literatura científica canadenc dels àmbits de la ciència política i la sociolingüística, a l'anàlisi de les polítiques lingüístiques de l'Estat espanyol. Després d'una revisió dels conceptes i del seu context d'aparició dins dels processos de reconeixement de la minoria francòfona al Canadà, s'estudia com el marc constitucional espanyol i el seu desenvolupament normatiu i jurisprudencial han afavorit, des de la dècada dels vuitanta, l'existència d'un bilingüisme de sentit únic, amb el castellà com a llengua “comuna” i per defecte de l'Estat. Aquesta situació de bilingüisme de sentit únic s'observa estudiant un seguit de mecanismes jurídics, com ara la jerarquització constitucional de les llengües, la inacció de l'Estat pel que fa a la protecció efectiva de les llengües diferents del castellà i la limitació de la capacitat normativa de les comunitats autònomes en matèria de política lingüística, principalment per via jurisprudencial. A aquests mecanismes s'afegeix l'existència d'una concepció conflictiva de la cohabitació de llengües en virtut de la qual tot reconeixement de les llengües pròpies implicaria un atac a la preeminència del castellà. Partint d'aquests fets, se suggereix com a conclusió la superació d'aquest paradigma mitjançant la normalització completa de les llengües espanyoles, seguint l'exemple del castellà, i la generalització d'una equitat lingüística més gran.

Paraules clau: política lingüística; multilingüisme; bilingüisme de sentit únic; nínxol territorial; plenitud institucional; Espanya; llengües espanyoles; Canadà; francesos canadencs.

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Article received: 01.10.2021. Blind reviews: 30.10.2021 i 03.11.2021. Final version accepted: 30.11.2021

**Recommended citation:** Jim nez-Salcedo, Juan i Carbonneau, Jean-R mi. (2021). One-way bilingualism: the obstacles to the institutional completeness of Spain's peripheral languages. *Revista de Llengua i Dret, Journal of Language and Law*, 76, 1-21. <https://doi.org/10.2436/rid.i76.2021.3728>

## Summary

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- 4 Discussion: asserting language rights or supremacism?
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## 1 Territorial niches and institutional completeness

Jean Laponce became known in the 1980s for his work on the unequal relationships between language groups, paying particular attention to the minoritisation of French in North America. Strongly influenced by the sociolinguistics of the 1960s and 1970s (which provided the inspiration for Catalonia's language policy, before snowballing across the rest of Spain's periphery), this French-born political scientist posited a theory of reciprocal repulsion between languages in individuals at a neuropsychological level and, by macro-sociological extension, at a territorial and geographical one. He based this theory on the hypothesis that bilingualism is difficult for the individual in terms of learning a second language, and of memorising, retaining and retrieving it for communication (1987). This phenomenon has specific geographical and political consequences. It can be seen how, inevitably, in areas of contact, the dominant group seeks to avoid bilingualism by transferring the burden to the dominated group. Thus, "the lesser linguistic effort and a rejection of semantic confusion lead to geographic concentration, a concentration that has, as a corollary for the minority, the need for reassuring borders" (Laponce, 1980, p. 479).<sup>1</sup>

So, starting from the principle that languages require stable borders to permit, firstly, the creation of a clear perimeter to separate them from other languages and, secondly, to counteract the omnipresent nature of the majority language (without anything in exchange for the minority language-speaking group), as well as to overcome the social inequalities arising from this situation, Laponce suggests the creation of "territorial niches" (*niches territoriales*) to benefit national minorities, upon the basis of federated or independent states. In these niches "communication will take place in one single language that can bind together the various individuals in a given society and satisfy the various roles of any individual therein" (1987, p. 3). In the absence of their "own" geographical areas, minority languages must ensure that they are exclusively used in the greatest possible number of social fields and their speakers need to practice bilingualism by juxtaposing the two languages and thus prevent contact between them (1987, p. 34; 2006, p. 16).<sup>2</sup>

Canadian sociologist Raymond Breton, born amongst the French-speaking minority of the province of Saskatchewan, studied the degree of ethnolinguistic cohesion between immigrant communities in Montreal during the 1960s before turning, in the 1980s, to analysing the situation of Canada's francophone communities scattered across the country. Breton showed that a minority's ability to ensure the presence of its language in different fields depends on the power of attraction of its institutional system. This system embraces both the informal networks of interpersonal relationships and the formal organisations of a minority. To measure this capacity, Breton (1964) coined the notion of *institutional completeness*. At its highest level, institutional completeness means that the members of a minority (immigrant, language or national) can enjoy, thanks to a dense network of institutions, a complete provision of services in key areas of the community such as education, culture, healthcare, social services, as well as professional, economic, religious and recreational activities. "The concept of 'institutional completeness' refers, firstly, to the range of activity sectors organised within a collective [that is a linguistic minority]" (1985b, p. 9) and reflects its ability to perpetuate itself, thanks to "a social organisation that is able to maintain – if not increase – its numbers" and thereby limit "integration into the majority's social system" "and the ease with which people can cross the ethnic frontier" (1985a, p. 77–78). In other words, thanks to the dynamism and force of attraction of its network of institutions, a minority manages to ensure the handing down of its language from generation to generation in the different fields and activities of social life. The more complete this network is, the more feasible it becomes to live one's life in the minority language in question.

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1 All translations from works published solely in French, Catalan and Castilian are those of the article's authors.

2 Such areas, in which it is desirable for the minority language to secure itself "dominant strategic positions" (1987, p. 36) and a high "frequency of use", embrace the entirety of the speakers' social lives. Laponce would later establish an exhaustive list of them (2006, p. 112): the language spoken at home between the different interlocutors (family members and others living under the same roof) and the language of interpersonal relations (friends, neighbours and associations), that of personal communications (telephone calls, emails, letters, etc.), the media (press, radio and television), of free time (on holiday, reading, the theatre, concerts, etc.), shopping (whether in local shops or supermarkets), work (with superiors or subordinates, suppliers, customers, etc.), education (in class, but also outside of it, mainly in the playground), religion (books, sermons and the like), in healthcare (when speaking with doctors, dentists and in the hospital), the public administrations (the town hall, taxes, etc.) and government (be it local, regional, national or supra or international).

Additionally, “a community whose international system is global can become one where you can be born, live and die”, a situation that is uncommon for a language minority (Breton, 1985b, p. 9) “which lacks its own territory” (1983, p. 36). It is reasonable to think that French finds itself in a better situation in Quebec than in the remainder of Canada’s provinces, where French speakers are always in the minority, scattered amongst different territories in which they do not hold the reins of power. It is true that “the presence of linguistically homogenous institutions” can partly offset the lack of any “own” territory and, to a degree, ensure that “language minorities have an institutional space in which they can live and express their culture in their own language” (Foucher, 2012, p. 91). This being said, the geographic variable plays a significant role in the health of a language minority’s network of institutions:

A further requisite is a density of population that ensures that the members of the ethnic minority will be able to find, in a geographic area of action within reach of communication at reasonable cost, speakers of the same language who satisfy the demands of their different social roles. In other words, the density of the minority population must be such that one does not need to use another language with the grocer, restaurateur, lawyer, or politician. (...) Linguistic concentration reduces the costs of communication. For a minority afraid of assimilation, it also reduces the temptation to “desert” (Laponce, 1987, p. 159).

According to Laponce, four institutions are crucial to the protection of minority languages (2006, p. 166). Whilst the *family* ensures the passing on of the language in the private sphere, principally due to endogamy, the *school* reinforces its position as a bridge to the public sphere. The *market* is essential for the linguistic health of a minority in that it provides it with an independent economic life sheltered from interference from the majority and, in return, has a positive impact on the use of the vernacular language within the minority community and on its degree of institutional completeness, as Breton (1985a, pp. 84–89) has stressed. The *government* remains, however, the institution *par excellence* that protects a minority language against the hegemonistic tendencies of the majority language group, since it is in the sphere of politics that the main coercive tools for governing the conflict are to be found (Laponce, 2006, p. 166).

So it is that “government” is the only institution empowered to govern language relations in different social spheres and the only one that can interfere in dynamics favouring the dominant language. This interference can work in two ways: be this on a non-territorial basis, through the granting of language rights that are essentially individual in nature to minority groups in different social areas, or by providing said groups, on the basis of the recognition of collective rights, a territorial platform capable of guaranteeing a more advanced level of institutional completeness that permits the local blocking of the hegemony of the language of the dominant group. These two types of language protection overlap with the two classic principles that structure communications in bilingual societies: those of personality and territoriality. “On the first principle, language rights follow *persons* wherever in the state they may choose to live; on the second, they depend on what part of the *territory* of the state persons find themselves in” (Patten & Kymlicka, 2003, p. 29, italics in the original). For Laponce, equal individual rights granted to linguistic groups that are, de facto, unequal – i.e. rights conceived of in this way so as not to inconvenience the dominant group and, above all, prevent its members from having to shoulder the burden of bilingualism – are insufficient to properly protect geographically concentrated language minorities:

The recognition of purely individual linguistic rights (of the type in which each person speaks the language of his or her choice) is, and could only be, a recognition of the status quo, and hence of asymmetry, if there is asymmetry. (...) To protect a minority language, not by ineffective individual rights but by group rights, requires territorial rights (1987, p. 156).

Territoriality is subject to the degree of linguistic heterogeneity and of concentration of communities. According to Patten, unilingual territoriality is applicable to cases of perfect linguistic concentration, something that only very rarely happens in reality. Depending upon the degree of dispersion of language communities, it is sometimes possible to establish territorial niches in the form of monolingual regions and districts, or bilingual districts within monolingual regions where small linguistic minority areas subsist (Patten, 2003). According to Van Parijs, a regime of linguistic territoriality “is the only effective and acceptable way of preventing the gradual extinction of language, a language with which a community’s identity is tied” (2012, p. 81). In this case, we are dealing with a “territorially-differentiated coercive regime” that imposes, to different degrees, one (or sometimes two) official languages within the limits of a given territory (Van Parijs, 2011, p. 133).

The implementation of a linguistic territoriality regime must be regarded not as a closed system, but rather as a system that forms part of a broader social context, where languages live alongside one another in different territories in which one of them is “queen” (2011, p. 147). For Van Parijs, this situation is balanced out by the principle of “territorial reciprocity”, by virtue of which those who impose their language in their historic territory accept the imposition upon themselves of another place’s language if they wish to settle there (2011, pp. 149–154). By clarifying the language-related expectations of the native population with regard to immigrants, this rule of symmetry plays a pacifying role in inter-group relations (Patten, 2003, p. 299).

## 2 One-way bilingualism

As a proponent of language minorities’ territorial autonomy, Laponce developed different incarnations of “linguistic federalism” in the 1980s, when working on his key work *Languages and Their Territories* (1987), which we have already mentioned on a number of occasions. Beyond Canada, to which he dedicated many pages, he analysed the case of the USSR, whose collapse just a few years later nobody at the time could foresee. He noted that, there, “bilingualism is a one-way street” (1987, p. 116); in other words, despite the end put to the “policy of systematic Russification” characteristic of Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union’s language policy nevertheless consisted in “promotion of Russian at the expense of other languages (...) by denying the minority languages the ability to penetrate Russian territory” (1987, p. 173), or, to put it another way:

[T]here are no Ukrainian schools or universities in Russia, and minority languages are not used in the central administration. Russians established in the other republics (particularly in the Slavic republics) are able to use their own language in the schools and in the administration. This asymmetry works to the advantage of Russian, the linguistic frontiers of which permit exit but forbid entrance (1987, p. 173).

After the fall of the USSR in 1991, Russian retained its role as an inter-ethnic lingua franca in all the former Soviet republics due to its greater prestige and the significant number of Russian speakers living outside of the Russian Federation (some 36.5 million), present since the communist era as the result of the Soviets’ one-way bilingualism policy and Russification efforts (Cabal Guarro, 2013).<sup>3</sup> According to Laponce, the USSR and post-1978 Spain formed part of the same category of states, as Sudan and Somalia did,<sup>4</sup> whose linguistic terrains feature “situations of incomplete dominance by an indigenous language” (1987, p. 100). More precisely, “[i]n such states, though multilingual, the dominant language alone is recognized and used as the official language of the central government; subordinate languages are often located on the peripheries, and the dominant language plays the role of lingua franca throughout the whole state” (Laponce, 1987, p. 100).

In many multilingual states it is undeniable that language transfers towards the dominant language (which was not necessarily the majority one at the start of the process, but which was “naturally” helped to become so thanks to a dynamic of increasing return) are, in part, associated with the processes of economic and social modernisation implemented during the 19th and 20th centuries such as the industrialisation and urbanisation of societies and the geographical mobility of individuals. All of this was accompanied by a growing tendency to associate hegemonic languages with progress and social mobility, and to equate “peripheral languages (...) with the pre-industrial society, backwardness and/or the rural world”, as Sorolla notes (2015, p. 329). Thus, the nation-building process of the dominant groups of contemporary states has been labelled *civic*, associated with the notion of *patriotism* (assuming that this term can be semantically distinguished from *nationalism*), whilst at the same time limiting the political and cultural demands of national and language minorities to the dishonourable field of “ethnic” nationalism (Lecours & Nootens, 2011; Carbonneau, 2016). This is the habitual narrative of sociologists and historians associated with the “Modernist” school of nationalism, such as Kohn (1955), Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1990), who have spread a series of presumptions and preconceptions regarding the peripheral minorities of contemporary states.<sup>5</sup>

3 This helps explain the reluctance of the Baltic nations and the Ukraine to recognise the language rights of their significant Russian-speaking minorities. For an analysis of the relative importance of languages in post-Soviet Moldavia and the role of Russian as a lingua franca, see Weirich (2021).

4 These two states would embrace federalism in 1991 and 2004, respectively, evidently too late in the former case, to prevent the eventual secession of South Sudan in 2011.

5 For a critical analysis of Modernist positions, see Smith (1999, pp. 3–19), Conversi (2006), Calhoun (2007, pp. 147–167), Lecours & Nootens (2011) and May (2012, pp. 20–93).



In contrast with this argument, others “give as the main *cause* [of language replacement] the dominance wielded by the nation state in the modernisation process to homogenise the population and, in particular, to minoritise peripheral language communities, with processes such as the one-way bilingualisation of minoritised language communities” (Sorolla Vidal, 2015, p. 329, italics in the original). According to Landry, this is a phenomenon of unquestionably political origin, in the sense that it emerges from unequal power relationships, at least between language groups: “the power relationships between ethnic groups means that bilingualism is often one-way in nature. Only the minority group becomes bilingual, and always with the stigma of having to fight to preserve its mother tongue” (1982, p. 230).

The idea of bilingualism as a “one-way street” used by Laponce – that we will rephrase here as “one-way bilingualism” to better reflect the original French text (Laponce, 1984, p. 107) – is inspired by the debates around linguistic justice in Canada. There, the 1960s were marked by a growing opposition to the bilingualism traditionally imposed by monolingual English speakers upon French speakers throughout the country, including Quebec. This opposition impacted the coexistence of the two groups in a number of ways, mainly in the form of the creation of bilingual institutions that helped secure the institutional completeness of French speakers outside of Quebec (i.e. those lacking any territorial niche). Still, these new structures often crystallised existing linguistic behaviours and normalised the tendency of English speakers to offload the burden of bilingualism onto French speakers, as could be seen in the bilingual universities of the province of Ontario, the University of Ottawa, the Laurentian University, and the Royal Military College of Canada):

None of the three institutions is truly (completely) bilingual in the sense that a decision has been taken to ensure the parity of the two languages and the parity of the two groups. (...) The bilingualism practised there is above all “unilateral”: that of French Canadians. It is they, teachers and students alike, who are bilingual or who most aspire to become it. In reaction to this, some even vilify this “one-way” bilingualism (Painchaud, 1968, p. 215).<sup>6</sup>

Since the 1960s, the expression *one-way bilingualism* has frequently appeared in Canada’s public forums as a means of denouncing actions circumventing the language protection function of the Quebecois territorial niche, the limitations of Canadian language legislation and the absence of reciprocity in languages between French and English speakers. The latter remain obstinately monolingual, both outside of and even inside the province of Quebec,<sup>7</sup> from both an institutional and a sociological standpoint, despite the Anglophones’ general commitment to learn French. Issues the subject of dispute in which “one-way” or “unilateral” bilingualism can be seen in Canada include the asymmetry between the rights of French speakers outside of Quebec and those of English speakers in said province (Grandchamp, 2002; Joncas, 2013), the double standards with regard to bilingualism in the internal workings of Canada’s civil service, including that of Quebec (Lafortune, 2008; FTQ, 2021), within federal political parties (Buzzetti, 2011) and in university media (Trans-Ho, 2011), or in the difficulties in being served in French in several shops in Montreal (Une Montréalaise déplore le ‘bilinguisme à sens unique’, 2016) and, more generally, French speakers (including those of Quebec) having the obligation to learn English and the privilege afforded to English speakers of being able to remain monolingual (Beauregard, 2017).<sup>8</sup>

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6 This quote from Louis Painchaud is taken from his comparative study, commissioned by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission). The Commission’s report, published in 1963, together with that of the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights in Québec (the Gendron Commission), of 1968, were the origin of the officialisation of the French language at a federal level by means of the Official Languages Act of 1969 (cemented by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982), the making of French the sole official language of Quebec through the Official Language Act of 1974 and, above all, the 1977 Charter of the French Language (Gémar, 2008). This latter Law would have a great influence over language policy in Catalonia, according to Miquel Reniu i Tresserras (2002, pp. 186–187), Director-General for language policy in Catalonia from 1988 to 1996.

7 According to the 2016 census (the most recent published), only 6.8% of English-speakers outside of Quebec call themselves bilingual in English and French. In Quebec itself, the figure stands at 66.2% despite the fact that French is the sole official language of the province (Statistics Canada, 2019), a situation that starkly contrasts with that of Ontario (which is also officially monolingual, but this time in English), which is the second-ranked province in terms of French speakers (490,715 who have it as a mother tongue and 504,130 for whom it is their first official spoken language), of whom only 40,040 regard themselves as monolingual (Statistics Canada, 2021).

8 For example, the outcry caused recently by Air Canada’s CEO Michael Rousseau, who said he could, fourteen years long, “live in Montreal without speaking French”, adding that this was “a testament to the City of Montreal” (Lau, 2021).

After the 2018 announcement by Justin Trudeau's liberal government of its intention to update Canada's Official Languages Act (OLA), the beginning of 2021 saw the publication of a document containing a plan working "toward a substantive equality" between French and English (Canadian Heritage, 2021; see also Foucher, 2021).<sup>9</sup> Civil society groups such as the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ) union submitted a position paper to the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Official Languages on the reforms (FTQ, 2021). Whilst praising the federal government's initiative, the FTQ noted how, 50 years after the passing of the OLA, bilingualism in Canada remains a "one-way street" that favours English speakers (2021, p. 5). This asymmetry also threatens the right to work in French in Quebec, not only in companies under federal jurisdiction, but even in the federal civil service, where there are "deep-rooted informal discriminatory practices" that have caused "a sensation of normalcy" (2021, p. 4). Based on these observations, the FTQ demands that "the French-speaking communities of Canada be provided access to the same services as Quebec's English-speaking communities, and the sooner the better" and that leading federal players, such as federal ministers, the Supreme Court, diplomats and the city of Ottawa (the federal capital), become truly bilingual (2021, p. 5, 7). In short, the position of this powerful Quebecois union on one-way bilingualism is a distant echo of the conclusions reached by Laponce after the consecration, thanks to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of an abstract policy of equal treatment for the languages – abstract in the sense of making an abstraction of the empirical socio-linguistic reality: "Is it reasonable to think that egalitarian solutions can correct acquired asymmetrical situations?" (1987, p. 155).

Above and beyond the case of Canada, the concept of one-way bilingualism based on unequal power relations has been expressed in other contexts. It has been invoked principally to illustrate the penetration of English in Ireland's Gaeltacht districts (Lenoach, Ó Giollagáin and Ó Curnáin, 2012), the diglossia of indigenous populations in Latin America (Escobar, 2006, p. 727) and North America (Drapeau, 2021) and also the traditional bilingualism of German speakers in the bilingual Swiss canton of Fribourg/Freiburg as an excuse for French speakers not to learn German (Boder, 1999). It would appear that one-way bilingualism is an option capable of travelling beyond the specific context of Canada, as is also true of the concepts of *territorial niche* and *institutional completeness*. All three can be applied quite well in the study of language policies in Spain.

### 3 One-way bilingualism in Spain

The political and legal treatment of the coexistence of languages in Spain provides a paradigmatic case study for the application of the aforementioned concepts. The fact is that Spain's constitutional framework, its regulatory implementation and case law have fostered the existence of one-way bilingualism, with Castilian as its de facto "common" language. The mental and legal asymmetry between Castilian and the other languages of Spain (Marí, 2004, p. 25) have limited the latter's chances of accessing the territorial niches inherent in institutional completeness.

Article 3 of Spain's Constitution contains a hierarchical and asymmetrical legal recognition of languages and citizens' language rights (Tasa, 2017, p. 749). The Spanish Constitution establishes a two-tier declaration of officiality that could be described as asymmetrical or the basis of a system of impure territoriality, to use the terms coined by Vernet (2004, p. 39): on the one hand, Section 1 establishes the official nature of Castilian as the language of the State, while limiting the official nature of the other languages (or, at least, those so defined as such in the relevant Autonomous Community statutes) to their respective territories (Fabeiro, 2013, pp. 42–43). This system of two-tier officiality forms the basis of an effective and complete territoriality for Castilian, which enjoys a "language policy of normality", abetted by a range of authorities without any explicit mandate for normalising Castilian, but which adopt policies regarded socially as "normal" and which "are only made explicit in public debate when it is felt that interference from other languages impedes Castilian from holding this position of normality" (Bodoque, 2011, p. 146) or, rather, its hegemonic position. On the other hand, the way in which it strictly limits remaining languages to their respective autonomous territories,

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<sup>9</sup> After years of consultations and the publication of this document, in June 2021, Trudeau's government introduced Bill C-32 before the House of Commons, which was passed on first reading. Proceedings were, however, suspended shortly afterwards due the calling of national parliamentary elections by the Prime Minister. Trudeau's goal was to ensure a more comfortable majority in Parliament: this he did not secure, meaning that Bill C-32's future prospects still remain (as of December 2021) uncertain.

like sealed compartments (Zabaltza, 2017, p. 54), leads to a deterritorialisation of the latter (Jiménez-Salcedo, 2019b), as they are split between different legal systems that underpin a wide variety of language policies.

This situation of deterritorialisation is applicable to Basque and Galician, which have acceded to the official status contemplated in Article 3.2 of Spain's Constitution, but which are also spread between different territories with different degrees of recognition. The case of Catalan is probably the most complex and widely studied, as the language is spread across five legal systems featuring language policies that range from the active (within the limits of Autonomous Communities' powers), as is the case with Catalonia, to a complete lack of recognition, as occurs in Murcia, and embracing Aragon (Escudero Medina, 2009), where Catalan is subject to deficient regulations and lacks the support of being declared an official Autonomous Community language, even in those geographical areas in which it boasts deep historical roots. According to Tasa's classification of levels of recognition (2017, pp. 74–75), if Level One (the sole level of recognition for the State as a whole) can only be attributed to Castilian by virtue of Article 3.1 of the Constitution, Catalan could have one of up to four different levels, depending upon the territory in which it is spoken: Level Two in Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and predominantly Catalan-speaking areas of the Autonomous Community of Valencia, Level 3 in the predominantly Castilian speaking areas of Valencia, Level Four in the Catalan-speaking area in Aragon (commonly called *La Franja*) and Level Five in the Catalan-speaking municipalities of Murcia.

The case of the Autonomous Community of Valencia is also interesting because, although Catalan is an official language there, its language policies have been characterised by what Pradilla (2008) has dubbed “underplanning” by Socialist regional governments (1983–1995) and the subsequent “counterplanning” by right-wing ones (Esteve, 2004). Underplanning is represented by the Law on the Use and Teaching of Valencia (LUEV, in the Catalan acronym), legislation that was not really a true law on language planning (Esteve & Esteve, 2019), unlike those of the remainder of Spain's Catalan-speaking Autonomous Communities, and lacks any regulatory development. As of today, the LUEV has been incapable of guaranteeing the right of users and consumers to be attended in Catalan, which should be inherent in any declaration as an official Autonomous Community language, even decades after the region of Valencia attained Autonomous Community status (Alcaraz, Ochoa & Isabel, 2004, p. 117, 121). In line with this trend, the new Statute for the Autonomous Community of Valencia does not represent any significant improvement in terms of either the recognition of language rights or the overcoming of linguistic secessionism (Teodoro, 2008).

Turning to counterplanning, Pradilla (2008, pp. 76–77) defines this as “an institutional practice that is, at best, indolent, when not openly hostile”, yet which is presented as a “supposed policy of reclaiming an own language [*llengua pròpia*]”, with a “patina of verisimilitude that adorns the dignification of Valencian with a noble and often grandiloquent formulation”. Counterplanning policies mainly consisted in the administrative and discursive limitation of the importance of Catalan as a language of public communication, as well as of its learning while favouring the processes of disaggregating the linguistic domain as a cognitive map (Montoya Abat, 2009), depicted as fragmented (according to linguistic secessionism, Catalan and Valencian are different languages), while at the same time proclaiming an allegedly post-national and global pan-Hispanic unity (Del Valle, 2007).

This core part of Valencian linguistic counterplanning was highlighted by the Committee of Experts on the application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in Spain. Examining the fact that “Valencian citizens holding university diplomas in Catalan Philology are faced with difficulties in selection competitions for teaching positions in Valencia”, the Committee noted in its fourth monitoring round that “[t]he Valencian Government has continued to ignore relevant court sentences (some 46 at October 2014) that confirm the unanimous position of academia which says that ‘Catalan’ and ‘Valencian’ are two names that refer to the same language” (2016, § 552). The systematic reference made to *Valencian* and *Catalan* in the following report every time the Valencian Autonomous Community's own language is mentioned (2019, Section 2.2.3) reflects the Council of Europe's rejection of Valencian language secessionism. Aside from the ideological (and unscientific) nature of the secessionist position, from a strictly legal standpoint, it should be noted that it is contrary to Spain's very legal order, as Article 7.1.b ECRML establishes that Spain must base its policies, legislation and practice on “the respect of the geographical area of each regional or minority language in order to ensure that existing or new administrative divisions do not constitute an obstacle to the promotion of the regional or minority language in question”. It should not be forgotten that this instrument



of international law has been ratified by Spain and therefore forms part of the constitutional precepts of its national law.

Added to the distinction between the capacities granted by Article 3.1 and those of Article 3.2 of the Spanish Constitution is the lack of implementation of Article 3.3. regarding the “language modalities” that shall be the “object of special respect and protection”, which is particularly serious due to the fact that this precept constitutes, as Arzoz notes (2009, p. 110), the clause on the cultural identity of the constitutional state, one that establishes not only protection for languages and modalities as cultural heritage, but the State’s obligation to foster institutional multilingualism, an area in which much work still needs to be done. One real-life example of this indolence is provided by the activities – or lack thereof – of both the Council for Official Languages in the General State Administration and the Office for Official Languages: the Council has met only six times since its creation in 2007,<sup>10</sup> while the Office has had no activity at all, as far as can be ascertained. This despite the fact that the Royal Decree on their creation (Royal Decree 905/2007, of 6 July, on the creation of the Council of Official Languages in the General State Administration and the Office for Official Languages) establishes as the Office’s mission “the study, promotion, provision of advice on, planning and placing on record of the use of official languages in both the central services and the peripheral structure of the General State Administration” (Article. 8.2): in other words, active language policy monitoring and planning functions.

The official existence of these bodies would appear to be aimed more at justifying some degree of administrative activity by the State with a view to ECRML compliance reports than any actual political will to usher in real changes (Nogueira, 2014, pp. 101–102). In its fourth report on the application of the Charter in Spain, the Committee of Experts noted with regard to this matter that “[t]he establishment of the Council of Official Languages in the General State Administration was an encouraging step towards facilitating the co-ordination between State ministries and Autonomous Communities, but in reality the frequency of meetings and the output delivered by this body has been very low” (Council of Europe, 2016, Finding D, p. 98). Concerned about the provision of bilingual services by the peripheral administration of the State to Autonomous Communities with their own language, the Committee noted in its previous report that “[t]here does not seem to be an overall policy or strategic approach to analyse the overall current state of affairs and plan a more systematic provision of documents and sufficient staff with an adequate knowledge of Catalan”. The Committee encouraged the Spanish authorities, in vain as it would later turn out, “to provide sufficient resources to the Council of Official Languages in the General State Administration to carry out this task” (Council of Europe, 2012, § 285),<sup>11</sup> a mission that would consist in ensuring the functional integrity of its territorial niches – something that has still not been achieved – for Catalan, Basque and Galician, as well as the institutional completeness of these languages in the field of the provision of public services.

This hierarchical system that favours Castilian greatly restricts the ability of Autonomous Communities to advance the institutional completeness of their own languages. A good example of this is provided by the Constitutional Court’s (Castilian, *Tribunal Constitucional*, [TC]) interpretation of the very concept of *own language* (*llengua pròpia*) in Judgement STC 31/2010 on the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006. It should not be forgotten that the Catalan Statute states that “Catalonia’s own language is Catalan” (Art. 6.1) and “Catalan is the official language of Catalonia, together with Castilian, the official language of the Spanish State” (Art. 6.2). For the interpreter of the Constitution, declaring a language to be a territory’s own language and declaring its official status in the same territory are one and the same: in other words, a language is considered a territory’s *own language* because it is a given territory’s historical language and therefore it is the only one that can be declared as official (FJ 14). This denies the concept of *own language* any possibility of hierarchisation locally favourable to Catalan, restricts the regulatory capacity of Autonomous Communities in the field of language planning, recognised by the TC itself,<sup>12</sup> and introduces a supposedly egalitarian interpretative criterion for the languages of Spain (Pons, 2011, pp. 126–127), by virtue of which no statute of autonomy may introduce any kind of distortion that may upset the “ideal” balance between the official language types allegedly established by Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution.

10 The most recent meeting took place on 29 December 2020 (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Función Pública, n.d.).

11 The Committee used exactly the same words to refer to the situation in all six Autonomous Communities analysed (see also § 394, 559, 670, 828 and 984).

12 STC 74/1989, of 24 April, and STC 337/1994, of 23 December.

In this way, the TC is limiting any broader doctrinal interpretation of Article 3.2 to the effect that that delegation to Autonomous Community statutes and regulatory implementation (principally in the form of the relevant language policy laws) might permit fine-tuning of declarations of officiality to the benefit of own languages to compensate for their situation of minoritisation, as indicated in the past by a part of the legal doctrine (Milian, 1983, p. 241; Segura, 1984, pp. 240–241). This “radical” equality (Ridao, 2014, p. 75) between all Spanish languages advocated by the 2010 judgement would seem to ignore the social and demographic context of Spain’s own languages, a context that is far from favourable to the latter and, from a legal standpoint, would invalidate freedom of language choice, since this arises directly from language planning policy, as Nogueira notes (2014, p. 86). Furthermore, the purported equality of Spanish languages is, in fact, a fallacy, since Castilian has the status of the sole language of the State, the sole official language of monolingual Autonomous Communities and is, furthermore, assigned equal status in Autonomous Communities with their own languages, thereby making it the sole “necessary official language, whilst assigning others a secondary or subordinate place” (Pons, 2011, p. 134).

This asymmetry in the official nature of Spain’s different languages entails a limitation on the ability of Autonomous Communities to govern languages’ functional fields and to create environments of institutional completeness. One area of great legal dispute has been that of education, chiefly with regard to the regulation of the vehicular use of Catalan in Catalonia (Corretja, 2016; Pradilla, 2016; Jiménez-Salcedo, 2019a). The judicial activism unleashed by the aforementioned STC 31/2010 is affecting the “language conjunction” model employed in the Catalan school system, even though this had previously been upheld by the TC’s own judgements, mainly in STC 337/1994, of 23 December, a benchmark judgement on constitutional language rights in the field of education. Indeed, a recent administrative judgement by the High Court of Justice of Catalonia established, arbitrarily and with no pedagogic or educational basis (Flors-Mas & Manterola, 2021, p. 33), a minimum of 25% of teaching in Castilian (Ridao, 2021, p. 23). This not only has no relationship with either the state of revitalisation of Catalan or with the degree of social understanding of Castilian, but also represents a new front in the intensification of one-way bilingualism.

Within this context of the limitations on the ability of Autonomous Communities to regulate languages, there is a need to highlight Spain’s juridically monolingual nature, based on the aforementioned Article 3.1 of its Constitution, which designates Castilian as the exclusive language of the State (Ridao, 2014, p. 74). This legal dimension is accompanied by an implicit language policy in favour of Castilian on the part of Spain’s state institutions and a plethora of all manner of authorities, whose mission is to ensure that the presence of Castilian in public policies is perceived of as “normal”, in a social sense as well (Bodoque, 2009, p. 15). Proof of this policy is provided by indicators as varied as the ubiquity of Castilian in the Spanish Parliament (and even in the Senate, despite it being a chamber with members appointed by the parliaments of the Autonomous Communities), the absence of languages other than Castilian in the state-wide broadcasts by RTVE (the state broadcaster) and the scant – almost token – presence of said languages in the provision of information by the State (Spanish Government websites, for example) or as languages used by public enterprises (the railways, post office, airports, etc.), amongst many other aspects.

Language planning in areas such as the judiciary are constrained by a system of distribution of powers little suited to the allegedly decentralised management of a state like Spain. This system short-circuits the language reparation mission of the six territorial niches of the periphery, as set forth in their statutes of autonomy and the relevant sectoral legislation. For example, the Spanish Constitution itself establishes the exclusive competence of the central State in the administration of justice (Arts. 117 ff., Art. 149.1.5, Art. 152) (Colom, 2002, p. 20). The regulation of language usage by the courts in Article 231 of Spain’s Law on Judicial Power (LOPJ) also establishes a language hierarchy, as it stipulates Castilian as the default language of the judicial agents of the State (judges, magistrates, clerks and civil servants) (Art. 231.1), without prejudice to the ability to use other languages, with two important restrictions: the language must be an official one of the territory in which the judicial actions are taking place and none of the parties may object to it on the grounds of a denial of due process (Art. 231.2). This criteria of territoriality (an official language other than Castilian may only be used if it is official in the territory in which the proceedings are taking place) is also applied to the oral and written statements of the parties, representatives, witnesses and experts (Art. 231.3), which may be translated at the request of a party (Art. 231.4).

The provisions of the LOPJ have furthered the role of Castilian as the default language of the justice system, despite the mandate for the recognition of linguistic pluralism contained in the aforementioned Article 3.3 of the Spanish Constitution and in the ECRML, which obliges the judiciary to take concrete measures (Nogueira, 2014, p. 88). Indeed, the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts quickly identified Article 231 LOPJ as one of the main stumbling blocks to the application of the ECRML in Spain, and has systematically criticised its existence in all its reports. In the latest, published in 2019, paragraph 11 contains the following statement:

Despite this recommendation, adopted in every monitoring period since the first cycle, and recent amendments to the legislation, no progress has been made in this respect. Article 231 of the Organic Law of Judicial Power still hampers the application of Article 9 of the Charter. (...) Although the use of co-official languages is not forbidden in principle, their use requires translation and thus lengthens the procedures. This situation is a barrier to the practical application of co-official languages in the judiciary.

Added to this are other aspects, such as the aforementioned exclusive competence of the State in judicial matters established by the Spanish Constitution, the lack of an obligation on the part of the State's judicial players to have knowledge of official languages other than Castilian, which is only regarded as a merit,<sup>13</sup> despite the requirement for a knowledge of Catalan on the part of judges and magistrates established by Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy (ruled constitutional by STC 2010), the lack of any obligation to respond to users in any language other than Castilian, as well as the existence of a Spanish legal culture that imposes Castilian as the primary language of laws, training, doctrine and case law (Nogueira, 2014, p. 114). This state culture of institutionalised monolingualism has caused cracks in the protective structures of the six territorial niches of Spain's periphery, chiefly in Catalonia, where it has harmed the efforts made by the Government of Catalonia since the 1980s to normalise Catalan in the public administrations. This fact has not gone unnoticed by the Council of Europe's emissaries:

According to the Catalan Government, State judicial authorities still recruit staff with no competence in Catalan at all levels of administration of justice. In administrative bodies of the autonomous community, 96% of the employees in direct contact with the public are competent in Catalan. However, according to representatives of the speakers, the use of Catalan by State administrative authorities continues to be low (2019, Section 2.2.2., § 43).

This is even more the case with the State's law enforcement bodies and the armed forces (Tasa, 2017, p. 71) whose attributions stem from Articles 149.1.29 and 149.1.4 of the Spanish Constitution and in which Castilian has an almost entirely dominant presence, even in those Autonomous Communities with co-official languages. Whilst the Mossos d'Esquadra and Ertzaintza (the police forces of Catalonia and the Basque Country, respectively) aim to serve the public in their region's own language, the State's law enforcement has been singled out in the six territorial niches of the Spanish periphery, beginning with the particular case of Navarre, of which special mention has been made that "the Police Headquarters (...) provide services in Castilian only" in the linguistic "Mixed area" (Council of Europe, 2008, § 409). This violates the public's right to be attended in Basque, as guaranteed by Article 17 of Law 18/1986, of 15 December, on the Basque language.<sup>14</sup> Note has also been taken of the difficulties that the Civil Guard and National Police have in dealing with the public in the own language of the Basque Country (Council of Europe, 2008, § 595; 2019, § 10), Catalonia (2019, § 44), Valencia (2008, § 925; 2012, § 821–822) and the Balearic Islands (2008, § 757; 2012, § 663), where it also places on record the "inappropriate treatment of citizens when speaking Catalan to Spanish security forces" (2016, § 459, see also § 467).

<sup>13</sup> With regard to the LOPJ, specific mention can be made of articles 431 (language-related merit – instead of the obligation – for the temporary provision of judges' positions) and 483 (optional but not qualifying nature of language knowledge tests for civil servants working for the Justice Administration). The fact that the language requirement is not more clearly regulated by the LOPJ leaves it in the hands of whatever stipulations the specific job announcement may contain, with any litigation that may arise therefrom. Even though constitutional case law has established the full legality of language requirements for public servants (STC 49/1991, of 28 February), Nogueira (2014, p. 111) notes how the case law of Spain's Supreme Court has expressed some resistance to linking the rights of users to employ their choice of official language with any obligation on the part of the public administration to provide it, something that really should be enabled by the procedures to enforce users' language rights, above all in the field of the judiciary. Alcaraz, Ochoa & Isabel (2004, p. 124) have highlighted the restrictive nature of the Supreme Court's judgements on the imposition of a language-related requirements upon judges and magistrates, in clear doctrinal contradiction with the ECRML.

<sup>14</sup> The same precept is equally applicable to the non-Basque speaking area, pursuant to Article 18 of the same instrument.

This state of play creates a Castilianised administration that encourages users – and also administration actors – to use Castilian (Colom, 2002, pp. 34–35), the language that ends up being regarded as “normal” for the system, whilst remaining languages are banished from these fields. Thus it is that the language-related precepts of state legislation and their on-the-ground implementation end up naturalising a situation of one-way bilingualism that could begin to be resolved with a more flexible legal system that is more favourable to Spanish languages other than Castilian. Furthermore, these cracks in the language policies of the different Autonomous Communities, uniformising in scope, help chip away at the institutional completeness of speakers of minority languages in a significant number of areas of use, with a consequent reduction in the capacity of their “inter-organisational system” (Breton, 1985b, p. 6) to attract new recruits likely to follow the principal of territorial reciprocity (Van Parijs, 2011), which lies at the heart of the idea of the territorial niche.

#### 4 Discussion: asserting language rights or supremacism?

In December 2017, the *Hablamos español* (We Speak Spanish) movement started a “popular legislative initiative” to overturn Catalonia’s language conjunction system in education and impose “Spanish” – meaning Castilian – as the language of instruction. On the very first day of collecting signatures in the Puerta del Sol, in the heart of Madrid, 30,000 of the required 500,000 were secured (Més de 30.000 madrilenys, 2017). The threat of the disappearance of Castilian – both in Catalonia and the other territories with their own languages – has been used in recent years to fuel a conflictive vision of the coexistence between languages, as if Castilian giving ground to other languages, necessary in terms of historical redress and sociolinguistic compensation, were simply unthinkable. The pre-eminence of Castilian is viewed as the natural order of things and as equating with “Spanishness”, and any change to this situation would be due to nationalist (chiefly Catalan and Basque) “supremacism”, whose sole mission it is to subvert the harmonic distribution of languages of 1978, with Castilian as the “common language” of all Spaniards – a viewpoint that does little to hide their own supremacism, albeit one associated with the use of Castilian in this case.

The fact is that Spain’s language problem is not that the rights of Castilian speakers in Catalonia and the remaining bilingual Autonomous Communities are not respected, but rather that Castilian speakers are the only group that can ensure enforcement of an individual right set forth in the Constitution, one denied to the members of the other three main language communities, and also to the smaller ones, such as the speakers of Asturleonese, Aragonese and Aranese, who have also contributed to the creation of Spain and who therefore, in principle at least, have the same degree of historical legitimacy. The furious reactions to Catalan, Basque and Galician language policy, commonplace since the 1980s, are couched in terms of legitimate defence against “nationalist” attacks on the “peaceful coexistence” between language groups, when they actually entail the assertion of an individual right that, just as with the collective bilingualism to which it gives rise, is, again, “one-way”. It is thus less of a *right* and more of an institutionalised *privilege* that is not only based on historically unequal power relationships but also on a rejection of territorial reciprocity. This, at least, is the conclusion reached by May after analysing the obstacles to promoting French in Quebec and Catalan in Catalonia (2012, p. 269):

As with Quebec, ongoing opposition to promotion-oriented language rights is often couched in terms of individual rights – most usually, the right of majority language speakers (Spanish, in this case) to remain monolingual. (...) Similarly, the criticism of potential ‘illiberality’ needs to be applied equally to majoritarian language policies, and not just minority ones. After all, if Spanish speakers in Spain can regard the formal recognition of their language, within their own historic territory, as an inalienable right (with no question of illiberality), why cannot Catalans as well?

However, as noted above, the territorial reciprocity of language communities has the role of pacifying conflicts to the point of creating the conditions necessary for “linguistic justice” on a state-wide scale (Van Parijs, 2011) and gives the idea of territorial niches itself its very meaning (Laponce, 1987). In Spain, as well as in other places, territorial reciprocity has the role of not only reflecting the different juxtaposed historic linguistic legitimacies, but is also a necessary precondition for linguistic justice, because it permits the carrying out



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of a process of historical redress aimed at reversing the effects of decades – going back at least to the 19<sup>th</sup> century – of fairly sustained policies of language replacement (Fernández, 2008).<sup>15</sup>

It is true that the notion of “linguistic justice” has been developed in the form of different representations in recent decades, principally from the standpoints of the principles of territoriality and personality, and has been the subject of theoretical debate in which different authors have offered critical analyses with regard to different state contexts (Laponce, 1987; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Kymlicka and Patten, 2003; Parent, 2011; McGarry and O’Leary, 2012; Basta et al., 2015; Malloy and Palermo, 2015; Malloy and Salat, 2020). In particular, the territorial conception of Van Parijs gave rise to an important debate between him, De Schutter and other language policy commentators, especially in Belgium and with regard to the language conflict in Brussels (De Schutter, 2008, 2011; Van Parijs et al., 2011; De Schutter and Robichaud, 2016), in which the parties have a tendency to extrapolate the features of language mixing in this city’s configuration and to excessively relativize all and any geographic groupings of speakers. We believe that, in general, the territorial solution is not the only way of guaranteeing linguistic justice and that there are other formulas, stemming from either the principle of personality or a combination of the two, to achieve this goal. In Spain, however, the principle of personality is used to guarantee, with regard to the entirety of the territory of the State, the hegemony of one particular language group that enjoys greater respect for its dignity than any other group thanks to the normative status quo, at both a formally and an informally institutional level,<sup>16</sup> whilst at the same time forcing minority groups to shoulder the burden of one-way bilingualism.

The granting of a language right that can only be enjoyed by members of the dominant linguistic group, in the form of a principle of personality valid throughout the territory, is problematic for many reasons. Firstly, because it makes meaningless the principle of equality between citizens, key to the Spanish Constitution (principally its Articles 9 and 23), not to mention the autonomy of Spain’s regions and nationalities (Art. 2). For this very reason, this exclusive right not only neutralises the sphere of action of the territorial niches created by constitutional law and their underlying principle of territorial reciprocity (necessary for coexistence based on restorative justice), but, furthermore, it also destroys the power of attraction of institutions that allows the citizens of these peripheral regions to fully live in their own languages in all spheres of social life. Even more importantly, though, it allows Castilian speakers to take advantage of the illegitimate normality imposed by Franco’s dictatorship and benefit from its linguistic results, which is practically equivalent to retroactively legitimising its policy of the elimination of minority languages. All in all, the “right” of the speakers of the dominant language to remain monolingual reflects, to make use of Coakley’s words, an “implicit but deeply rooted acceptance that the dominant culture is the only appropriate one for the state” (2011, p. 116).

Ever since the arrival of democracy in Spain, Castilian has been portrayed as the default lingua franca and the neutral language of the workings of the State, supposedly ethnically indifferent, with a purportedly cross-cutting nature, and even as “universal” *à la française* (Lafont, 1968), and as the only really suitable language for exercising “Spanish” citizenship. Is this really the case, though? The fact is that the semantic confusion between “Spanishness” and the language and culture of Castile is nothing new and can easily be traced back to the marriage of the “Catholic Monarchs” in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Its mark was left wherever the Habsburg and Bourbon kings of Spain made use of their divine right of conquest, mainly in the New World, where the linguonym *castellano* comes as a surprise to many Hispanophones who think they speak *español*. Although the Spanish Constitution makes clear reference to *castellano*, the conflation of *español* and *castellano* is commonplace in Spain, even amongst the main political parties which, to add to the confusion, frequently make

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15 The idea of territorial reciprocity, and also the impediments to its full implementation, were known to the politicians of the Balearic Islands at the time of the formulation of its 1986 Language Normalisation Act and are reflected in the preamble: “the Catalan language and the Castilian language are both the official languages of the Autonomous Community, with the same rank, albeit with a different nature: the official status of the Catalan language is based on a “status of territoriality”, with the purpose of predominance of each language in its traditional territory. The official status of Castilian, established by the Constitution for the entire state, is based on a status of personality, to safeguard the language rights of citizens, even if their language is not the territory’s own language.”

16 In Spain, as elsewhere, the dominant national group can find support in a range of formal and informal institutions to impose its language in different areas of use and to limit the degree of institutional completeness of language minorities long established in the “national” territory. This institutional constraint with regard to language-related behaviour entails not only political rules and legal provisions, but also unwritten rules, social practices and informal codes of conduct that help preserve a status quo that favours the dissemination of the dominant language. For an analysis of German institutions’ constraints against the institutional completeness of the Sorbian minority, see Carbonneau (2017).



the distinction in their electoral programmes between “the Spanish language” and “the Spanish languages” (Carboneau, 2020). This semantic confusion gives rise to another, more deeply rooted one that is shared with other contemporary states: that between *the state* and the *national majority*, “the two categories tend to be co-extensive, and their respective ideological stances and priorities on the question of national minorities may be hard to disaggregate” (Coakley, 2011, p. 102).

And it is here that the idea of linguistic supremacism makes complete sense. The Castilian-speaking media, politicians and members of the public who are outraged at the language planning actions of the six territorial niches of the Spanish periphery pursuant to the principal of territorial reciprocity (only to be expected in a country that is being trumpeted as “federal” by its political scientists) display a breathtaking two-facedness when denouncing such actions as forms of “supremacism”, when the fact is that it is they who wish to impose this, only on a far larger scale. They are not demanding their own slice of the cake, but rather the whole linguistic cake in its entirety. Just as the British Royal Navy proclaimed, in times past, its mastery of the seas, whilst tolerating vessels under the flags of other countries in “its” waters, what we are now witness to is the supremacy of Castilian over the entirety of Spanish territory, in the form of a “right” and upon the basis of an identity symbiosis. So, what other way is there of interpreting this imposition, based on one-way bilingualism, the subject of this special section of the *Journal of Language and Law*, than as the expression of an ethnic privilege, in the sense given by sociologist Anthony Smith (1999) to the concept of ethnic community: in other words, a human population with shared sociocultural characteristics upon whose basis it builds myths around a common ancestry and a glorious past?

Advocates of a primordial(ly) Castilian Spain, of which there are so many in Spanish society as a whole and in certain media outlets and political parties, often accuse Catalonia and other Autonomous Communities with co-official languages of a lack of solidarity when the latter demand a fairer allocation of funding in line with each Community’s real GDP. These critics should ask themselves what the real cost is of a one-way bilingualism funded out of everyone’s pockets, including those of speakers of Spanish languages other than Castilian, who ended up paying for their “Castilianisation” through tax revenues sent to Madrid that are disproportionate when compared to other federal systems such as Canada or Germany. This had already been pointed out by Van Parijs nearly twenty years ago when he alluded to this double standard, which has now become commonplace in Spain, and called for an allocation of the costs of one-way bilingualism such that Castilian speakers would contribute to the burden of having to learn the majority language in terms of teachers’ salaries, the costs of teaching materials and the investment of time and effort. Van Parijs concluded that the debate around the debt owed by Castilian speakers to Catalan speakers “can go on forever. But there is no need to wait for [Catalan] to die out before the Castilian natives should start preparing the cash they owe to the Catalans (...) unless they find it more convenient for them (...) to replace cash transfers by [sic] tolerance” (2003, p. 167). Rather than relying on ethnic privilege and dreaming of a “Greater Castile”, Spain and its society should, instead, commit themselves to the complete revitalisation of Spain’s other languages, both those that are already co-official and those that aspire to be so, and look to achieving greater linguistic equity in line with an appreciation of linguistic diversity.

## **5 Introduction to this monographic issue, *One-way bilingualism***

This monographic section brings together the contributions of ten specialists in the analysis of language policies in Spain. The central theme of their articles is the application of the concept of one-way bilingualism suggested by Jean Laponce to different fields and case studies. The first three articles analyse, from different viewpoints, the legal, socio-anthropological and political consequences of Spain’s constitutionally-enshrined linguistic asymmetry. The work penned by Vicenta Tasa Fuster of the University of Valencia analyses the ideological dimension of the Spanish Constitutional Court judgements in language-related cases, which has tended to bolster the official status of Castilian, portraying it as the “common language” whilst at the same time diminishing official statuses for other languages stipulated in the statutes of Autonomous Community. According to Tasa Fuster, this case law establishes an unequal distribution of languages contrary to the provisions of the Constitution itself, which actually stipulates a far more balanced relationship, as would seem to be proven by a full reading of Article 3 (and not just of Article 3.1) alongside the remaining precepts referring to Spain’s language diversity as a collective heritage that is the object of special respect and promotion.

The article by Carlos Suari Rodrigue (Rovira i Virgili University) and Xosé Antón González Riaño (University of Oviedo and the Academy of the Asturian Language) looks at the case of Asturian, as a language that has been subject to a broad-based process of revitalisation but that has nevertheless failed to ensure that it is declared an official language under the terms of Article 3.2 of the Spanish Constitution or to secure proper legal protection. Based on an analysis of a body of documentation, the authors provide an overview of the ideological movements that are preventing Asturian from being recognised as an official language. A similar case is that of Aragonese and Catalan in Aragon, which José Ignacio López Susín (Directorate-General for Language Policy of the Government of Aragon) analyses in his contribution on the basis of the hypothesis of the existence of a *tertium genus* or status of “quasi-officiality” for those own languages not declared official in Aragon’s Statute of Autonomy. Based on an analysis of a body of legislation and case law, chiefly Aragon-based, the author notes the presence of a double discrimination, not only against the speakers of these languages compared with Castilian, but also against other languages of Spain that have managed to be declared co-official.

The other three articles examine, from standpoints associated with discourse analysis and sociolinguistics, the representations of one-way bilingualism based on a range of sources, such as the press, social media and online discussions. Carmen Marimón Llorca (University of Alicante) analyses the presence of the concept of *language conflict* in the Spanish press between 1976 and 2012, using as her source a corpus of metalinguistic texts (columns on language) that propagate a conflictive ideology portraying Castilian as a deified language within the paradigm of Spanish language nationalism, but one that is, at the same time, threatened by the State’s other languages. Similar sociolinguistic representations, in terms of Castilian supremacy and linguistic nationalism, are studied by Chrystelle Burban (Paul Valéry-Montpellier University 3) based on the discourse of social media users opposed to Catalonia’s “conjunction model” and linked with associations for the defence of Castilian. This is also the case of the text from Karolin Breda (European University Viadrina Frankfurt [Oder]) and Philipp Krämer (Free University of Berlin), which analyses the discourses rejecting the revitalisation of Basque on the basis of a corpus of online discussions around the passing of a regulation on the use of the territory’s own language in local authorities and its role in education in the Basque Country during the COVID-19 pandemic. The work reveals a vision of this language policy as imposing a supposedly irrelevant language to the detriment of *the* “national” one (Castilian) as a key part of the political programme of what are regarded as “nationalist elites”.

In conclusion, the seven articles in this special section make a further contribution to the debate around the current state of the distribution of languages in Spain, from a range of viewpoints and underlying paradigms, such as law, anthropology, sociolinguistics and political science, and based upon various starting points (legislation, case law, the press, social media, etc.). The conclusions of the works presented here all seem to point in the same direction and more than justify, it seems to us, the title we have chosen: the persistent presence of a one-way bilingualism in Spain that has been established by the evolution of case law and the different political and legislative disputes between Spain and the Autonomous Communities, as well as one that has been socially disseminated by means of representations of a supremacist ideology of Castilian as the default, common and, perhaps – in the not-too-distant future – sole language of Spain.

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